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Book Reviews
Next we are presented with a long chapter
(almost one-quarter of the volume) profiling
the labor market. This is a rich empirical section, taking us competently through the labor
force and its composition, unemployment,
domestic and international migration, estimates of earnings functions, and the institutional underpinnings. The authors support
the consensus view that the labor market is
“reasonably competitive” (p. 81), subject to the
qualification that unemployment remained
quite high during the 1980s.
The final chapter in this introductory section examines education and training systems.
Here the evidence is somewhat mixed. The
country scores well with respect to the provision of universal primary (and, increasingly,
secondary) education, and in closing the colonially inherited gender and ethnic gaps in enrollment ratios. Yet there are concerns: about
educational quality; that enrolments in science and technology-based courses may be
insufficient; whether the disproportionate investments (and subsidies) for elite bumiputera schools and the tertiary system are
appropriate; and about training and technology transfer in the foreign-dominated manufacturing sector (especially the huge electronics
industry).
The four chapters in Part B of the volume
develop these arguments with reference to
detailed sectoral chapters, on agriculture,
manufacturing, services, and the public sector. The latter is particularly pertinent, given
its size and the government’s explicit affirmative action policies. Part C switches to a
more prescriptive approach, with a broadranging set of policy proposals, a number of
which have since been adopted.
This is a well-presented and cogently argued book. The exposition is clear, it is wellreferenced (subject to one caveat below), and
it achieves a nice balance between analytics,
empirics, and country insights. Particularly welcome are the microeconomic data on labor
and education, much of which are not generally available, even among the Malaysian
academic and policy communities.
The major limitation of the volume is the
delay in its publication. It presumably draws
on material the authors completed around
1990 and, apart from some updating of mac-

681

roeconomic series, little seems to have been
added since then. Almost all the references
stop at 1990, while the labor market and educational data rarely go beyond the late 1980s.
Delaying a publication by seven to eight years
in the case of a very high growth economy
can be a risky business. To give just one illustration, by around 1997 international migrants (many of them illegal) were thought to
number as much as 24 percent of the workforce, about double the figures quoted in this
book. (See Prema-Chandra Athukorala and
Chris Manning in 1999, Structural Change
and International Labour Migration in East
Asia. Ed. Chris Manning. Oxford University
Press.) Notwithstanding this limitation, the
authors have made a very useful contribution
to our understanding of Malaysian economic
development and of labor market adjustment
in developing economies.
HAL HILL
Australian National University
P Economic Systems
The Economics of the Good Society: The Variety
of Economic Arrangements. By Joseph S.
Berliner. Malden, Mass. and Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. Pp. ix, 448. $34.95, paper. ISBN
0–631–20828–3; cloth; 0–631–20829–1, pbk.
JEL 2000–0334
In the preface the author writes (p. viii):
“This book is written not for economists but for
people generally who like to muse about a better world. It presumes no more knowledge of
economics than that which one acquires in
the process of keeping informed about public
affairs.” Although the book is written on an
elementary level, it contains much that is of
interest to students and, in certain parts, to
professional economists.
After discussing how to assess economic
systems and the role that values play in such
a process, the author divides the remainder
into four major sections dealing with the distribution of consumer goods, the distribution
of work tasks, the coordination of an economy, and the ownership of property. Such an
organization has the advantage of starting at a
very concrete level of economic activity with
which all are familiar and then working
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toward more abstract problems. It has the
disadvantage of requiring a certain repetition
of materials, although this may be useful for
his intended audience.
At every point of his analysis Berliner provides a variety of examples from various economic systems to demonstrate how different
economic arrangements and institutions can
accomplish the same tasks. I found his discussion of the manner in which kibbutzim
handled critical problems of distribution and
production particularly illuminating. Such a
concrete approach also permits him to introduce various criteria of evaluation of economic performance of these institutions in an
understandable manner.
The clarity of the author’s prose, his resolute determination to argue his case without
diagrams or tables, and his judicious selection
of wide-ranging institutional materials make
this book a useful supplemental text in courses
on comparative economic systems. It also
provides readers with a broad perspective on
economic institutions and the way in which
they can be evaluated using simple analytical
tools that will be useful to them in other
fields of economics.
FREDERIC L. PRYOR
Swarthmore College
Financial Sector Transformation: Lessons from
Economies in Transition. Edited by Mario I.
Blejer and Marko Skreb. Cambridge; New
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University
Press, 1999. Pp. vii, 403. $59.95. ISBN 0–521–
64037–7.
JEL 99–1482
This volume is the collected outcome of
the Second Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economies (1996) sponsored by the Central Bank of Croatia. It suffers from the usual
problems afflicting conference volumes with
a great diversity of authors writing at both
micro and macro levels, and trying to span
the increasingly diverse financial experiences
of a variety of Eastern European economies—not to mention China. Nevertheless,
there are enough nuggets to make the book
potentially interesting to scholars trying to
understand the most difficult part of the transition problem: the proper evolution of the
domestic financial sector, including banking
systems which start under water.

At the very end of the book, Mario Blejer
nicely summarizes the main conceptual dilemma in undertaking financial reform in
transitional economies.
On one horn of the dilemma, the government itself needs to disengage from its unrestricted and pervasive control over the flow of
finance. It needs to withdraw from direct
credit activities, from bank ownership, and
from bank management. But simply “privatizing” the banks may not be enough because
commercial banks often remain politicized
whoever owns them. Commercial banks may
depend on ongoing access to the central bank
for credit if they have a bad loan portfolio. If
the government is running a large fiscal deficit, commercial banks may be heavily taxed
through high reserve requirements. So a fiscal reform might well be necessary before the
government can safely liberalize.
China is an example of an otherwise successful transition economy where large (implicit) fiscal deficits must still be covered by
massive borrowing from state-owned banks.
Here, privatization of these state banks, or
allowing unencumbered new banks including
foreign ones to compete with them, would be
extremely unwise.
On the other horn of the dilemma, the government must remain a vigilant regulator of
the financial system even as it disengages
from direct ownership and control. But latent
or not-so-latent moral hazard, particularly
in the commercial banks with their carryover
of bad loans and (implicit) undercapitalization, makes prudential regulation difficult. In
the presence of ongoing deposit insurance
and other bailout provisions, freeing interest
rates—even in the interbank market—may
be problematic. But for primary securities
markets, Poland’s Securities and Exchange
Commission has been most successful in enforcing accounting standards, full disclosure
of information on new security issues, centralized trading, and the protection of minority
stockholders.
In Chapter 3, Hillman and Ursprung present an interesting political economy model
of the relationship between banks and state
factories to which they had lent under socialism and which still pay “rents” to the managers of the bank. Although the loans of the

